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Abstract
In this paper, we present the actual risks of stealing user
PINs by using mobile sensors versus the perceived risks
by users. First, we propose PINlogger.js which is a
JavaScript-based side channel attack revealing user PINs
on an Android mobile phone. In this attack, once the user
visits a website controlled by an attacker, the JavaScript
code embedded in the web page starts listening to the mo-
tion and orientation sensor streams without needing any
permission from the user. By analysing these streams, it
infers the user’s PIN using an artificial neural network.
Based on a test set of fifty 4-digit PINs, PINlogger.js is
able to correctly identify PINs in the first attempt with
a success rate of 74% which increases to 86% and 94%
in the second and third attempts respectively. The high
success rates of stealing user PINs on mobile devices via
JavaScript indicate a serious threat to user security.
With the technical understanding of the information
leakage caused by mobile phone sensors, we then study
users’ perception of the risks associated with these sen-
sors. We design user studies to measure the general famil-
iarity with different sensors and their functionality, and
to investigate how concerned users are about their PIN
being discovered by an app that has access to all these
sensors. Our studies show that there is significant dis-
parity between the actual and perceived levels of threat
with regard to the compromise of the user PIN. We con-
firm our results by interviewing our participants using two
different approaches, within-subject and between-subject,
and compare the results. We discuss how this observation,
along with other factors, renders many academic and in-
dustry solutions ineffective in preventing such side chan-
nel attacks.
Keywords. Mobile sensors, JavaScript attack, Mobile
browsers, User security, User privacy, Machine learning,
PINs, Risk perception, User study
1 Introduction
Smartphones equipped with many different sensors such
as GPS, light, orientation and motion are continuously
providing more features to end users in order to inter-
act with their real-world surroundings. Developers can
have access to the mobile sensors either by 1) writing
native code using mobile OS APIs [17], 2) recompiling
HTML5 code into a native app [20], or 3) using stan-
dard APIs provided by the W3C which are accessible
through JavaScript code within a mobile browser1. The
last method has the advantage of not needing any app-
store approval for releasing the app or doing future up-
dates. More importantly, the JavaScript code is platform
independent, i.e., once the code is developed it can be ex-
ecuted within any modern browser on any mobile OS.
In-browser access risks. While sensor-enabled mobile
web applications provide users more functionalities, they
raise new privacy and security concerns. Both the aca-
demic community and the industry have recognised such
issues regarding certain sensors such as geolocation [19].
For a website to access the geolocation data, it must ask
for explicit user permission. However, to the best of our
knowledge, there is little work evaluating the risks of in-
browser access to other sensors. Unlike in-app attacks,
an in-browser attack, i.e., via JavaScript code embedded
1w3.org/TR/#tr_Javascript_APIs
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in a web page, does not require any app installation. In
addition, JavaScript code does not require any user per-
mission to access sensor data such as device motion and
orientation. Furthermore, there is no notification while
JavaScript is reading the sensor data stream. Hence, such
in-browser attacks can be carried out far more covertly
than the in-app counterparts.
However, an effective in-browser attack still has to
overcome the technical challenge that the sampling rates
available in browser are much lower than those in app.
For example, as we observed in [25], frequency rates of
motion and orientation sensor data available in-browser
are 3 to 5 times lower than those of accelerometer and
gyroscope available in-app.
In-browser attacks. Many popular browsers such as
Safari, Chrome, Firefox, Opera and Dolphin have al-
ready implemented access to the above sensor data. As
we demonstrated in [24] and [25], all of these mobile
browsers allow such access when the code is placed in
any part of the active tab including iframes (Figure 1, a).
In some cases such as Chrome and Dolphin on iOS, an in-
active tab can have access to the sensor measurements as
well (Figure 1, b). Even worse, some browsers such as Sa-
fari allow the inactive tabs to access the sensor data, when
the browser is minimised (Figure 1, c), or even when the
screen is locked (Figure 1, d).
Through experiments, we find that mobile operating
systems and browsers do not implement consistent access
control policies in regard to mobile orientation and mo-
tion sensor data. Partly, this is because W3C specifica-
tions [2] do not specify any policy and do not discuss any
risks associated with this potential vulnerability. Also, be-
cause of the low sampling rates available in browser, the
community have been neglecting the security risks associ-
ated with in-browser access to such sensor data. However,
in TouchSignatures [25], we showed that despite the low
sampling rates, it is possible to identify user touch actions
such as click, scroll, and zoom and even the numpad’s
digits. In this paper, we introduce PINLogger.js, an at-
tack on full 4-digit PINs as opposed to only single digits
in [25].
Mobile sensors. Today, sensors are everywhere:
from your personalised devices such as mobiles, tablets,
watches, fitness trackers, and other wearables, to your
TV, car, kitchen, home, and to the roads, parking lots,
and smart cities. These new technologies are equipped
with many different sensors such as NFC, accelerometer,
orientation and motion and are connected to each other.
These sensors are continuously providing more features
to end users in order to interact with their real world sur-
roundings. While the users are benefiting from richer and
more personalised apps which are using these sensors for
different applications such as fitness, gaming, and even
security application such as authentication, the growing
number of sensors introduces new security and privacy
risks to end users, and makes the task of sensor manage-
ment more complex.
Research questions. While sensors on mobile plat-
forms are getting more powerful, and starting to collect
more information about the users and their environment,
we want to evaluate the general knowledge about these
sensors among the mobile users. We are particularly in-
terested to know the level of concern people may have
about these sensors being able to threaten their privacy
and security.
Contributions. In this work, we contribute to the study
of sensors and their actual risks and their perceived risks
by users as follows:
• We introduce PINLogger.js, an attack on full 4-digit
PINs as opposed to only single digits in [25]. We
show that unregulated access to these sensors impose
more serious security risks to the users in compari-
son with more well-known sensors such as camera,
light and microphone.
• We conduct user studies to investigate users’ under-
standing about these sensors and also their percep-
tion of the security risks associated with them. We
show that users in fact have fewer security concerns
about these sensors comparing to more well-known
ones.
• We study and challenge current suggested solutions,
and discuss why our studies show they cannot be ef-
fective. We argue that a usable and secure solution is
not straightforward and requires further research.
2 User activities
The potential threats to the user security posed by an
unauthorised access to the motion and orientation sen-
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Figure 1: PINlogger.js potential attack scenarios; a) the malicious code is loaded in an iframe and the user is on
the same tab, b) the attack tab is already open and the user is on a different tab, c) the attack content is already open
in a minimised browser, and the user is on an installed app, d) the attack content is already open in a (minimised)
browser, and the screen is locked. The attacker listens to the side channel motion and orientation measurements of the
victim’s mobile device through JavaScript code, and uses machine learning methods to discover the user’s sensitive
information such as activity types and PINs.
sor data are not immediately clear. Here we demonstrate
two simple scenarios which show that sensitive user infor-
mation such as phone calls timing and physical activities
can be deduced from device orientation and motion sensor
data obtained from JavaScript.
Users tend to move their mobile devices in distinctive
manners while performing certain tasks on the devices,
or by simply carrying them. Examples of the former in-
clude answering a call or taking a photo, while the latter
covers their transport mode. In both cases, an identifi-
able succession of movements is exhibited by the device.
As a result, a web-based program which has access to the
device orientation and motion data may reveal sensitive
facts about users such as the exact timing information of
the start and end of phone calls and that of taking photos.
On the other hand, while the user is simply carrying her
device, the device movement pattern may reveal informa-
tion about the user’s transport mode, e.g., if the user is
stationary at one place, walking, running, on the bus, in a
car, or on the train. We present the results of two initial
experiments that we have performed on a Nexus 5 using
Maxthon Browser (as an example of a browser that allows
JavaScript to access sensor data even when the screen is
locked).
Motion and orientation sensors detail. Before, pre-
senting the results, we first explain the motion and ori-
entation sensors in detail. According to W3C specifica-
tions [2] motion and orientation sensor data are a series of
different measurements as follows:
• device orientation which provides the physical ori-
entation of the device, expressed as three rotation an-
gles (α, β, γ) in the device’s local coordinate frame,
• device acceleration which provides the physical ac-
celeration of the device, expressed in Cartesian co-
ordinates (x, y, z) in the device’s local coordinate
frame,
• device acceleration-including-gravity which is sim-
ilar to acceleration except that it includes gravity as
well,
• device rotation rate which provides the rotation rate
of the device about the local coordinate frame, ex-
pressed as three rotation angles (α, β, γ), and
• interval which provides the constant sampling rate
and is expressed in milliseconds (ms).
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Figure 2: Left: Three dimensions (x, y, and z) of acceleration data including gravity (from the motion sensor). The
start time, duration, and end time of four phone calls are easily recognisable from these measurements. Right: The
screenshot of the call history of the phone during the experiment.
The device coordinate frame is defined with respect to
the standard position of the mobile screen. When it is in
the portrait mode, x and y axes are in the plane of the
screen and are positive towards the screen’s right and up,
and z is perpendicular to the plane of the screen and is
positive outwards from the screen. Moreover, the sensor
data discussed above are processed sensor data obtained
from multiple physical sensors such as gyroscope and ac-
celerometer. In the rest of this paper, unless specified oth-
erwise, by sensor data we mean the sensor data accessi-
ble through mobile browsers which include acceleration,
acceleration-including-gravity, rotation rate, and orienta-
tion.
Phone call timing. In the first experiment, we opened
the website carrying our Javascript code, and then locked
the screen. The Javascript code continued to log orienta-
tion and motion data while the Android phone was left on
a desk. For this experiment, we used another phone to call
the Android phone four times with a few seconds apart
between the calls. As demonstrated in Fig. 2 (left), the 4
distinct phone calls along with their timing are recognis-
able from the three dimensions of acceleration (including
gravity) which come from the device motion sensor. For
a better comparison, Fig. 2 (right) shows the received call
history of the phone during the experiment with their start
Figure 3: Three dimensions (x, y, and z) of acceleration
data (from the motion sensor) during 22 s of sitting, 34 s
of walking and 25 s of running.
times and durations. As shown in this figure, the captured
sensor data match the call history.
User physical activities. In the second experiment, we
again locked the phone and recorded the sensor data dur-
ing 22 seconds of sitting, 34 seconds of walking and 25
seconds of slow running. We observed that the mentioned
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activities have visibly distinctive sensor streams. As an
example, Fig. 3 shows the acceleration data from motion
sensor. As it can be seen, the mentioned activities are
recognisable from each other since they are visibly differ-
ent in the sensor measurements.
Our initial evaluations suggest that discovering de-
vice movement related information such as call times
and user’s mode of transport can be easily implemented.
However, as we will explain, distinguishing user PINs is
a lot harder as the induced sensor measurements are only
subtly different. In the following sections, we will demon-
strate that, with advanced machine learning techniques,
we are able to remotely infer the entered PINs on a mo-
bile phone with high accuracy.
3 PINlogger.js
In this section, we describe an advanced attack on user’s
PINs by introducing PINlogger.js. In the following sub-
sections, we describe the attack approach, our program
implementation, data collection, feature extraction, and
neural network.
3.1 Attack approach
We consider an attacker who wants to learn the user’s PIN
tapped on a soft keyboard of a smartphone via side chan-
nel information. We consider (digit-only) PINs since they
are popular credentials used by users for many purposes
such as unlocking phone, SIM PIN, NFC payments, bank
cards, other banking services, gaming, and other person-
alised applications such as healthcare, insurance, etc. Un-
like similar works which have to gain the access through
an installed app [26, 30, 27, 11, 32, 33, 29, 36, 4, 12], our
attack does not require any user permission. Instead, we
assume that the user has loaded the malicious web con-
tent in the form of an iframe, or another tab while work-
ing with the mobile browser as shown in Figure 1. At
this point, the attack code has already started listening to
the sensor sequences from the user’s interaction with the
phone.
In order to uncover when the user enters his PIN, we
need to classify his touch actions such as click, scroll, and
zoom. We have already shown in TouchSignatures [25]
that with the same sensor data and by applying classifica-
tion algorithms, it is possible to effectively identify user’s
touch actions. Here, we consider a scenario after the touch
action classification. In other words, our attacker already
knows that the user is entering his PIN. Moreover, un-
less explicitly noted, we consider a generic attack sce-
nario which is not user-dependant. This means that we
do not need to train our machine learning algorithm with
the same user as the subject of the attack. Instead, we
have a one-round training phase with data from multiple
voluntary users, and use the obtained trained algorithm to
output other users’ PINs later. This approach has the ben-
efit of not needing to trick individual users to collect their
data for training.
3.2 Web program implementation
We implemented a web page with embedded JavaScript
code in order to collect the data from voluntary users.
Our code registers two listeners on the window object
to have access to orientation and motion data separately.
The event handlers defined for these purposes are named
DeviceOrientationEvent and DeviceMotionEvent respec-
tively. On the client side, we developed a GUI in HTML5
which shows random 4-digit PINs to the users and acti-
vates a nummpad for them to enter the PINs as shown in
Figure 4. All sensor sequences are sent to the database
along with their associated labels which are the digits of
the entered PINs. We implemented our server program
using Node.js (nodejs.org). Our code sends the orienta-
tion and motion sensor data of the mobile device to our
NoSQL database using MongoLab (mongolab.com, web-
based service for MongoDB). When the event listener
fires, it establishes a socket by using Socket.IO (socket.io)
between the client and the server and constantly transmits
the sensor data to the database. Both Node.js and Mon-
goDB (as a document-oriented database) are known for
being capable of supporting data intensive applications in
real time.
In the proof-of-concept implementation of the attack,
we focus on working with active web pages, which allows
us to easily identify the start of a touch action through
the JavaScript access to the onkeydown event. A similar
approach is adopted in other works: e.g., TouchLogger
[11] and TapLogger [36]. In an extended attack scenario,
a more complex segmentation process would be needed to
5
Figure 4: Different input methods used by the users for
PIN entrance.
identify the start and end of a touch action. This could be
achieved by measuring the peak amplitudes of a signal, as
done in [29].
3.3 Data collection
Following the approach of Aviv et al. [4] and Spreitzer
[33], we consider a set of 50 fixed PINs with uniformly
distributed digits. We created these PINs in a way that all
digits are repeated about the same time (around 20 times).
The data collection code is publicly available via github.
Technical details of the data collection process and the
collected data are publicly available too2.
We conducted our user studies using Chrome on an An-
droid device (Nexus 5). The experiments and results are
based on the collected data from 10 users, each entering
all the 50 4-digit PINs for 5 times. Our voluntary partici-
pants were university students and staff and performed the
experiments at university offices. We simply explained to
them that all they needed was to enter a few PINs shown
in a web page.
In relation to the environmental setting for the data col-
lection, we asked the users to remain sitting in a chair
while working with the phone. We did not require our
users to hold the phone in any particular mode (portrait
or landscape) or work with it by using any specific input
method (using one or two hands). We let them choose
their most comfortable posture for holding the phone and
working with it as they do in their usual manner. While
watching the users during the experiments, we noticed
that all of our users used the phone in the portrait mode
by default. Users were either leaning their hands on the
2github.com/maryammjd/Reading-sensor-data-for-fifty-4digit-PINs
desk or freely keeping them in the air. We also observed
the following input methods used by the users.
• Holding the phone in one hand and entering the PIN
with the thumb of the same hand (Figure 4, left).
• Holding the phone in one hand and entering the PIN
with the fingers of the other hand (Figure 4, centre).
• Holding the phone with two hands and entering the
PIN with the thumbs or fingers of both hands (Figure
4, right).
In the first two cases, users exchangeably used either
their right hands or left hands in order to hold the phone.
In order to simulate a real world data collection environ-
ment, we took the phone to each user’s workspace and
briefly explained the experiment to them, and let them
complete the experiment without our supervision. All
users found this way of data collection very easy and
could finish the experiments without any difficulties. Our
participants were given each an Amazon voucher (worth
£10) at the end for their participation.
3.4 Feature extraction
In order to build the feature vector as the input to our
classifier algorithm, we consider both time domain and
frequency domain features. We improve our suggested
feature vectors in [25] by adding some more complex fea-
tures such as the correlation between the measurements.
This addition improves the results, as we will discuss in
Section 4. As discussed before, 12 different sequences
obtained from the collected data include orientation (ori),
acceleration (acc), acceleration-including-gravity (accG),
and rotation rate (rotR) with three sequences (either x, y
and z, or α, β and γ) for each sensor measurement. As
a pre-processing step and in order to remove the effect of
the initial position and orientation of the device, we sub-
tract the initial value in each sequence from subsequent
values in the sequence.
We use these pre-processed sequences for feature ex-
traction in time domain directly. In frequency domain,
we apply the Fast Fourier transform (FFT) on the pre-
processed sequences and use the transformed sequences
for feature extraction. In order to build our feature vec-
tor, first we obtain the maximum, minimum, and average
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values of each pre-processed and FFT sequences. These
statistical measurements give us 3 × 12 = 36 features in
the time domain, and the same number of features in the
frequency domain. We also consider the total energy of
each sequence in both time and frequency domains cal-
culated as the sum of the squared sequence values, i.e.,
E =
∑
v2i which gives us 24 new features.
The next set of features are in time domain and are
based on the correlation between each pair of sequences
in different axes. We have 4 different sequences; ori,
acc, accG, and rotR, each represented by 3 measurements.
Hence, we can calculate 6 different correlation values be-
tween the possible pairs; (ori, acc), (ori, accG), (ori, rotR),
(acc, accG), (acc, rotR), and (accG, rotR), each presented
in a vector with 3 elements. We use the Correlation co-
efficient function in order to calculate the similarity rate
between the mentioned sequences. The correlation co-
efficient method is commonly used to compare the simi-
larity of the shapes of two signals (e.g. [6]). Given two
sequences A and B and Cov(A,B) denoting covariance
between A and B, the correlation coefficient is computed
as below:
RAB =
Cov(A,B)√
Cov(A,A) · Cov(B,B) (1)
The correlation coefficient of two vectors measures
their linear dependence by using covariance. By adding
these new 18 features, our feature vector consists of a to-
tal of 114 features.
3.5 Neural network
We apply a supervised machine learning algorithm by us-
ing an Artificial Neural Network (ANN) to solve this clas-
sification problem. The input of an ANN system could be
either raw data, or pre-processed data from the samples.
In our case, we have preprocessed our samples by build-
ing a feature vector as described before. Therefore, as in-
put, our ANN receives a set of 114 features for each sam-
ple. As explained before, we collected 5 samples per each
4-digit PIN from 10 users. While reading the records, we
realised that some of the PINs have been entered wrongly
by some users. This was expected since each user was
required to enter 250 PINs. Since we recorded both ex-
pected and entered PINs in our data collection, we could
easily identify these PINs and exclude them from our
analysis. Overall, out of 2500 records collected from 10
users, 12 of the PINs were entered wrongly. Hence we
ended up with 2488 samples for our ANN.
The feature vectors are mapped to specific labels from a
finite set: i.e., 50 fixed random 4-digit PINs. We train and
validate our algorithm with two different subsets of our
collected data, and test the neural network against a sep-
arate subset of the data. We train the network with 70%
of our data, validate it with 15% of the records and test it
with the remaining 15% of our data set. We use a pattern
recognition/classifying network in Matlab with one hid-
den layer and 1000 nodes. Pattern recognition/classifying
networks normally use a scaled conjugate gradient (SCG)
back-propagation algorithm for updating weight and bias
values in training. Scaled conjugate gradient is a fast su-
pervised learning algorithm [28].
4 Evaluation
In this section we present the results of our attack on 4-
digit PINs in two different forms: multi-users mode, and
same-user mode. We also train separate ANN systems to
learn individual digits of PINs and compare these results
with other works.
4.1 Multiple-users mode
The second column of Table 1 shows the accuracy of our
ANN trained with the data from all users. In this mode,
the results are based on training, validating, and testing
our ANN using the collected data from all of our 10 par-
ticipants. As the table shows, in the first attempt PINlog-
ger.js is able to infer the user’s 4-digit PIN correctly with
accuracy of 74.43%, and as expected it gets better in fur-
ther attempts. By comparison, a random attack can guess
a PIN from a set of 50 PINs with the probability of 2% in
the first attempt, and 6% in three attempts.
4.2 Same-user mode
In order to study the impact of individual training, we
trained, validated and tested the network with the data col-
lected from one user. We refer to this mode of analysis as
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Attempts Multiple-users Same-user
One 74% 79%
Two 86% 93%
Three 94% 97%
Table 1: PINlogger.js’s PIN identification rates in differ-
ent attempts.
the same-user mode. We asked our user to enter 50 ran-
dom PINs, each five times, and repeated the experiment
for 10 times (rounds). The reason we have repeated the
experiments is that the classifier needs to receive enough
samples to be able to train the system. Interestingly, our
user used all three different input methods shown in Fig-
ure 4 during the PIN entrance. As expected, our clas-
sifier performs better when it is personalized: the accu-
racy reaches 79.23% in the first attempt, and increases to
93.52% and 97.71% in two and three attempts, respec-
tively.
In the same-user mode, convincing the users to pro-
vide the attacker with sufficient data for training cus-
tomised classifiers is not easy, but still possible. Ap-
proaches similar to gaming apps such as Math Trainer3
could be applied. Math-based CAPTCHAs are possible
web-based alternatives. Any other web-based game ap-
plication which segments the GUI similar to a numerical
keypad will do as well. Nonetheless, in this paper we
mainly follow the multiple-users approach.
4.3 Identification of PIN digits
One might argue that the attack should be evaluated
against the whole 4-digit PIN space. However, we believe
that the attack could still be practical when selecting from
a limited set of PINs since users do not select their PINs
randomly [9]. It has been reported that around 27% of all
possible 4-digit PINs belong to a set of 20 PINs4, includ-
ing straightforward ones like ‘1111’, ‘1234’, or ‘2000’.
Nevertheless, we present the results of our analysis of the
attack against the entire search space for the two experi-
ment modes discussed above. We considered 10 classes
of the entered digits (0–9) from the data we collected on
4-digit PINs used in Section 4.1.
3play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.solirify.mathgame
4datagenetics.com/blog/september32012/
Attempts Multiple-users Same-user
One 70% 79%
Two 83% 90%
Three 92% 96%
Table 2: Average digit identification rates in different at-
tempts.
In the multiple-users mode, we trained, validated, and
tested our system with data from all 10 users. In the same-
user mode, we trained personalised classifiers for each
user. Unlike the test condition of Section 4.2, we did not
have to increase the number of rounds of PIN entry here
since we had enough samples for each digit per user. In
the same-user mode in this section, we used the average
of the results of our 10 users. The average identification
rates of different digits for three different approaches are
presented in Table 2.
The results in our multiple-users mode indicate that we
can infer the digits with a success probability of 70.75%,
83.27% and 92.06% in the first, second, and third at-
tempts, respectively. This means that for a 4-digit PIN
and based on the obtained sensor data, the attacker can
guess the PIN from a set of 34 = 81 possible PINs with
a probability of success of 0.92064 = 71.82%. A random
attack, however, can only predict the 4-digit PIN with the
probability of 0.81% in 81 attempts. By comparison, PIN-
logger.js achieves a dramatically higher success rate than
a random attacker.
Using a similar argument, in the same-user mode the
success probability of guessing the PIN in 81 attempts
is 85.46%. In the same setting, Cai and Chen report a
success rate of 65% using accelerometer and gyroscope
data [3] and Simon and Anderson’s PIN Skimmer only
achieves a 12% success rate in 81 attempts using cam-
era and microphone [32]. Our results in digit recogni-
tion in this paper are also better than what is achieved
in TouchSignatures [25]. In summary, PINlogger.js per-
forms better than all sensor-based digit-identifier attacks
in the literature.
4.4 Comparison with related work
Obtaining sensitive information about users such as PINs
based on mobile sensors has been actively explored by
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Features Sensor Access Training Identification rate
Work 1st try 2nd try 5th try
PIN Skimming [33] Light in-app same-user NA 50% 65%
PIN Skimmer [32] Cam, Mic in-app same-user NA 30% 50%
Keylogging by Mic [29] Mic, Gyr in-app same-user 94% NA NA
TapLogger [36] Acc, Ori in-app same-user 40% 75% 100%
Acc side channel [4] Acc in-app same-user 18% NA 43%
PINlogger.js Motion, Ori in-browser multiple-users 74% 86% 98%
same-user 79% 93% 99%
Table 3: Comparison of PINlogger.js with related attacks on 4-digit PINs.
researchers in the field [23, 34]. In particular, there is a
number of research which use mobile sensors through a
malicious app running in the background to extract PINs
entered on the soft keyboard of the mobile device. For
example, GyroPhone, by Michalevsky et al. [26], shows
that gyroscope data is sufficient to identify the speaker
and even parse speech to some extent. Other examples
include Accessory [30] by Owusu et al. and Tapprints
[27] by Miluzzo. They infer passwords on full alphabeti-
cal soft keyboards based on accelerometer measurements.
Touchlogger [11] is another example by Cai and Chen
[3] which shows the possibility of distinguishing user’s
input on a mobile numpad by using accelerometer and
gyroscope. The same authors demonstrate a similar at-
tack in [12] on both numerical and full keyboards. The
only work which relies on in-browser access to sensors to
attack a numpad is our previous work, TouchSignatures
[25]. All of these works, however, aim for the individual
digits or characters of a keyboard, rather than the entire
PIN or password.
Another category of works directly target user PINs.
For example, PIN skimmer by Simon and Anderson [32]
is an attack on a user’s numpad and PINs using the camera
and microphone on the smartphone. Spreitzer suggests
another PIN Skimming attack [33] and steals a user’s PIN
based on the measurements from the smartphone’s ambi-
ent light sensor. Narain et al. introduce another attack [29]
on smartphone numerical and alphabetical keyboards and
the user’s PINs and credit card numbers by using the
smartphone microphone. TapLogger by Xu et al. [36] is
another attack on the smartphone numpad which outputs
the pressed digits and PINs based on accelerometer and
orientation sensor data. Similarly, Aviv et al. introduce
an accelerometer-based side channel attack on the user’s
PINs and patterns in [4]. We choose to compare PINlog-
ger.js with the works in this category since they have the
same goal of revealing the user’s PINs. Table 3 presents
the results of our comparison.
As shown in Table 3, PINlogger.js is the only attack
on PINs which acquires the sensor data via JavaScript
code. In-browser JavaScript-based attacks impose even
more security threats to users since unlike in-app attacks,
they do not require any app installation and user permis-
sion to work. Moreover, the attacker does not need to
develop different apps for different platforms such as An-
droid, iOS, and Windows. Once the attacker develops the
JavaScript code, it can be deployed to attack all mobile
devices regardless of the platform. Moreover, Touchlog-
ger.js is the only works which present the results of the
attack for multiple-users modes. By contrast, the results
from other works are mainly based on training the clas-
sifiers for individual users. In other words, they assume
the attacker is able to collect input training data from the
victim user before launching the PIN attack. We do not
have such an assumption as the training data is obtained
from all users in the experiment. In terms of accuracy,
with the exception of [29], PINlogger.js generally outper-
forms other works with an identification rate of 74% in
the first attempt. This is a significant success rate (despite
that the sampling rate in-browser is much lower than that
available in-app) and confirms that the described attack
imposes a serious threat to the users’ security and privacy.
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5 Why does this vulnerability exist?
Although reports of side channel attacks based on the in-
browser access to mobile sensors via JavaScript are rela-
tively recent, similar attacks via in-app access to mobile
sensors have been known for years. Yet the problem has
not been fixed. Here, we discuss the reasons why such a
vulnerability has remained unfixed for a long time.
5.1 Unmanaged sensors
In an attempt to explain multiple sensor-related in-app
vulnerabilities, Xu et al. argue that “the fundamental
problem is that sensing is unmanaged on existing smart-
phone platforms” [36]. There are multiple in-app side-
channel attacks that support this argument, as we dis-
cussed in the previous section. Our work shows that
the problem of in-app access to “unmanaged sensors” is
now spreading to in-browser access. Here we present the
“unmanaged” motion and orientation sensor case which
shows how the technical mismanagement of these sensors
causes serious user privacy consequences when it comes
to unregulated access to such sensors via JavaScript.
W3C vs. Android. According to W3C specifica-
tions [2], the motion and orientation sensor streams are
not raw sensor data, but rather high-level data which are
agnostic to the underlying source of information. Com-
mon sources of information include gyroscopes, com-
passes and accelerometers. In Tables 4 and 5, we present
raw (low-level) and synthesized (high-level) motion sen-
sors supported by Android [17] along with their descrip-
tions and units, as well as their corresponding W3C defi-
nitions [2].
As it can be seen from the tables, different terminolo-
gies have been used for describing the same measure-
ments in-app and in-browser. For example, while in-app
access uses the raw sensor terminology, i.e., accelerome-
ter, gyroscope, magnetic field, the in-browser access uses
synthesized sensor terminology, i.e., motion and orien-
tation [2]. This creates confusion for users (as we will
explain later) and developers (as we experienced it our-
selves). One of the W3C’s specifications on mobile sen-
sors, “Generic Sensor API” [1], dedicates a few sections
to the issue of naming sensors, and low-level and high-
level sensors. It discusses how the terminology for in-
browser access has been high-level so far. It also men-
tions that the low-level use cases are increasingly popu-
lar among the developers. As stated in this specification:
“The distinction between high-level and low-level sensor
types is somewhat arbitrary and the line between the two
is often blurred”. And, “Because the distinction is some-
what blurry, extensions to this specification are encour-
aged to provide domain-specific definitions of high-level
and low-level sensors for the given sensor types they are
targeting”. We believe due to the rapid increase of mo-
bile sensors, it is necessary to come up with a consistent
approach.
5.2 Unknown sensors
We believe another contributing factor is that users seem
to be less familiar with the relatively newer (and less ad-
vertised) sensors such as motion and orientation, as op-
posed to their immediate familiarity with well-established
sensors such as camera and GPS. For example, a user has
asked this question on a mobile forum: “... What benefits
do having a gyroscope, accelerometer, proximity sensor,
digital compass, and barometer offer the user? I under-
stand it has to do with the phone orientation but am un-
clear in their benefits. Any explanation would be great!
Thanks!”5.
We design and conduct user studies in this work in or-
der to investigate to what extent are these sensors and their
risks known to the users.
List of mobile sensors. We prepared a list of differ-
ent mobile sensors by inspecting the official websites of
the latest iOS and Android products, and the specifica-
tions that W3C and Android provide for developers. We
also added some extra sensors as common sensing mobile
hardware which are not covered before.
• iPhone 66: Touch ID, Barometer, Three-axis gyro,
Accelerometer, Proximity sensor, Ambient light sen-
sor.
• Nexus 6P7: Fingerprint sensor, Accelerometer, Gy-
roscope, Barometer, Proximity sensor, Ambient light
sensor, Hall sensor, Android Sensor hub.
5forums.androidcentral.com/verizon-galaxy-nexus/171482-
barometer-accelerometer-how-they-useful.html
6apple.com/uk/iphone-6/specs/
7store.google.com/product/nexus_6p
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Android Description Unit W3C def.
motion sensors
Accelerometer Acceleration force m/s2 Acceleration
along 3 axes with gravity
Gravity Force of gravity m/s2 NA
along 3 axes
Gyroscope Rate of rotation rad/s Rotation rate
around 3 axes
Uncalibrated Rate of rotation (no drift rad/s NA
gyroscope compensation), and
Estimated drift around 3 axes rad/s NA
Linear Acceleration force excluding m/s2 Acceleration
accelerometer gravity along 3 axes
Rotation Rotation vector Unitless NA
vector component along 3 axes
Step Number of user’s Steps NA
counter steps since last reboot
Table 4: Motion sensors supported by Android and their corresponding W3C definitions.
• Android [17]: Accelerometer, Ambient temperature,
Gravity (software or hardware), Gyroscope, Light,
Linear Acceleration (software or hardware), Mag-
netic Field, Orientation (software), Pressure, prox-
imity, Relative humidity, Rotation vector (Software
or Hardware), Temperature.
• W3C8 [2]: Device orientation (software), Device
motion (software), Ambient light, Proximity, Ambi-
ent temperature, Humidity, Atmospheric Pressure.
• Extra sensors (Common sensing hardware): Wire-
less technologies (WiFi, Bluetooth, NFC), Camera,
Microphone, Touch screen, GPS.
Unless specified otherwise, all the listed sensors are
hardware sensors. We added the last category of the sen-
sors to this list since they indeed sense the device’s sur-
rounding although in different ways. However, they are
neither counted as sensors in mobile product descriptions,
nor in technical specifications. These sensors are often
categorised as OS resources [35], and hence different se-
curity policies apply to them.
8w3.org/2009/dap/
5.3 User study
In this section, we aimed to observe the amount of knowl-
edge that mobile users have about mobile sensors. We
prepared a list of sensors based on what we explained
above and asked volunteer participants to rate the level of
their familiarity with each sensor. All of our experiments
and user studies were approved by Newcastle University’s
ethical committee.
5.3.1 Participants
We recruited 60 participants to take part in this study via
different means including mailing lists, social network-
ing, vocational networks, and distributing flyers in differ-
ent places such as different schools in the university, col-
leges, local shops, churches and mosques. A sample of
our call for participation is available in Appendix A.
Among our participants, 28 self-identified themselves
as male and 32 as female, from 18 to 67 years old, with a
median age of 33.85. None of the participants were study-
ing or working in the field of mobile sensor security. Our
university participants were from multiple degree pro-
grams and levels, and the remaining participants worked
in a different range of fields. Moreover, our participants
owned a wide range of mobile devices, and had been using
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Android Description Unit W3C def.
position sensors
Game Rotation vector component Unitless NA
rotation vector along 3 axes
Geomagnetic Rotation vector component Unitless NA
rotation vector along 3 axes
Geomagnetic Geomagnetic field strength µT NA
magnetic field along 3 axes
Uncalibrated Geomagnetic field strength µT NA
magnetic field (no hard iron calibration)
and Iron bias estimation µT NA
along 3 axes
Orientation Angles around 3 axes Degrees Orientation
Proximity Distance from object cm NA
Table 5: Position sensors supported by Android and their corresponding W3C definitions. Note: Orientation sensor
was deprecated in Android 2.2 (API Level 8).
a smartphone/tablet for 5.6 years on average. Our partic-
ipants were from different countries, and all could speak
English. We interviewed our participants at a university
office and gave each an Amazon voucher (worth £10) at
the end for their participation. Details of the interview
template can be found in Appendix B.
5.3.2 Study approach
For a list of 25 different sensors, we used a five-point scale
self-rated familiarity questionnaire as used in [21]: “I’ve
never heard of this”, “I’ve heard of this, but I don’t know
what this is”, “I know what this is, but I don’t know how
this works”, “I know generally how this works”, and “I
know very well how this works”. The list of sensors was
randomly ordered for each user to minimize bias. In addi-
tion, we needed to observe the experiments to make sure
users were answering the questions based on their own
knowledge in order to avoid the effect of processed an-
swers. Full descriptions of all studies are provided in Ap-
pendix B.
5.3.3 Findings
Fig. 5 summarizes the results of this study. This figure
shows the level of self-declared knowledge about differ-
ent mobile sensors. The question was: “To what extent do
you know each sensor on a mobile device?” Sensors are
ordered based on the aggregate percentage of participants
declaring they know generally or very well how each sen-
sor works. This aggregate percentage is shown on the
right hand side. In the case of equal aggregate percent-
age, the sensor with a bigger share on being known very
well by the participants is shown earlier. Our participants
were generally surprised to hear about some sensors and
impressed by the variety. As one may expect, newer sen-
sors tend to be less known to the users in comparison to
older ones. In particular, our participants were generally
not familiar with ambient sensors. Although some of our
participants knew the ambient sensors in other contexts
(e.g., thermostats used at home), they could not recognise
them in the context of a mobile device.
Low-level hardware sensors such as accelerometer and
gyroscope seem to be less known to the users in compari-
son with high-level software ones such as motion, orienta-
tion, and rotation. We suspect that this is partly due to the
fact that the high-level sensors are named after their func-
tionalities and can be more immediately related to user
activities.
We also noticed that a few of the participants knew
some of the low-level sensors by name but they could not
link them to their functionality. For example, one of our
participants who knew almost all of the listed sensors (ex-
cept hall sensor and sensor hub) stated that: “When I want
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Figure 5: Level of self-declared knowledge about different mobile sensors.
to buy a mobile [phone], I do a lot of search, that is why
I have heard of all of these sensors. But, I know that I do
not use them (like accelerometer and gyroscope)”.
On the other hand, as the functionalities of mobile de-
vices grow, vendors quite naturally turn to promote the
software capabilities of their products, instead of intro-
ducing the hardware. For example, many mobile devices
are recognised for their gesture recognition features by the
users, however the same users might not know how these
devices provide such a feature. For instance, one of the
participants commented on a feature on her smartphone
called “Smart Stay”9 as follows: “I have another sensor
on my phone: Smart Stay. I know how it works, but I
don’t know which sensors it uses”.
9samsung.com/us/support/answer/ANS00035658/234302/SCH-
R950TSAUSC
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6 User studies on risk perception of
mobile sensors
In this section, we study the participants’ risk perception
of mobile sensors. There have been several studies on risk
perception addressing different aspects of mobile technol-
ogy. Some works discuss the risks that users perceive on
smartphone authentication methods such as PINs and pat-
terns [18], TouchID and Android face unlock [15], and
implicit authentication [22]. Other works focus on the
privacy risks of certain sensors such as GPS [5]. In [31],
Raji et al. show users’ concerns (on disclosure of selected
behaviours and contexts) about a specific sensor-enabled
device called AutoSense10. To the best of our knowledge,
the research presented in this paper is the first that studies
the user risk perception for a comprehensive list of mobile
sensors (25 in total). We limit our study to the level of
perceived risks users associate with their PINs being dis-
covered by each sensor. The reasons we chose PINs are
that first, finding one’s PIN is a clear and intuitive security
risk, and second, we can put the perceived risk levels in
context with respect to the actual risk levels for a number
of sensors as described in Table 3.
6.1 Methodology
For this study, we divide our 60 participants into two
groups, and studied the two group separately using
two different approaches: within-subject and between-
subject. In the within-subject study, we interviewed 30
participants for all parts of the study. In contrast, in the
between-subject study, we interviewed a new group of 30
participants, and we later compared the results with the
previous group. By these two approaches, we aim to mea-
sure differences (after informing users on descriptions of
sensors) within a participant and between participants, re-
spectively.
6.1.1 Within-subject study
In this approach, we asked 30 participants to rate the level
of risk they perceive for each sensor in regards to reveal-
ing their PINs in two phases. In phase one, we gave the
same sensor list (randomized for each user). We described
10sites.google.com/site/autosenseproject/
a specific scenario in which a game app which has access
to all these sensors is open in the background and the user
is working on his online banking app, entering a PIN. We
used a self-rated questionnaire with five-point scale an-
swers following the same terminology as used in [31]:
“Not concerned”, “A little concerned”, “Moderately con-
cerned”, “Concerned”, and “Extremely concerned”. Dur-
ing this phase, we asked the users to rely on the infor-
mation that they already had about each sensor (see Ap-
pendix B for details).
In the second phase, first we provided the participants
with a short description of each sensor and let them know
that they can ask further questions until they feel confident
that they understand the functionality of all sensors. Par-
ticipants could use a dictionary on their device to look at
the words that were less familiar to them. Afterwards, we
asked the participants to fill in another copy of the same
questionnaire on risk perceptions (details in Appendix B).
Participants could keep the sensor description paper dur-
ing this phase to refer to it in the case they forgot the de-
scription of certain sensors.
6.1.2 Between-subject study
In this study, first we gave the description of the sensors to
our second group of 30 participants and similar to previ-
ous study we gave them enough time to familiarize them-
selves with the sensors and to ask as many questions as
they wanted until they felt confident about each sensor.
Then, we presented the participants with the questionnaire
on risk perceptions (details in Appendix B). Similar to our
previous study, participants could keep the sensor descrip-
tion paper while filling in this questionnaire.
6.1.3 Intuitive risk perception
The results of our within-subject study are presented in
Fig. 6. These results present the users’ perceived risk
for different mobile sensors for the same group of users
before (top bars) and after (bottom bars) being presented
with descriptions of sensors. The results of our between-
subject study are presented in Fig. 7. Note that this figure
represents the risk perception of group one of our partici-
pants before knowing the sensors descriptions, and group
two of participants after knowing the sensors descriptions.
For both figures, the question was: “To what extent are
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Figure 6: Users’ perceived risk for different mobile sensors for within-subject approach.
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Figure 7: Users’ perceived risk for different mobile sensors for between-subject approach.
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you concerned about each sensor’s risk to your PIN?”,
sensors are ordered based on the aggregate percentage
of participants declaring they are either concerned or ex-
tremely concerned about each sensor before seeing the
descriptions. This aggregate percentage is the first value
presented on the right hand side. In the case of equal ag-
gregate percentage, the sensor with a bigger share on be-
ing perceived extremely concerned by the participants is
shown earlier.
We make the following observations from the results of
the experiment.
Touch Screen. Although our participants rated touch
screen as one of the most risky sensors in relation to a
PIN discovery scenario, still about half of our participants
were either moderately concerned, a little concerned, or
not concerned at all. Through our conversations with
the users, we received some interesting comments, e.g.,
“Why any of these sensors should be dangerous on an
app while I have officially installed it from a legal place
such as Google Play?”, and “As long as the app with these
sensors is in the background, I have no concern at all”. It
seems that a more general risk model in relation to mobile
devices is affecting the users’ perception in regard to the
presented PIN discovery threat. This fact can be a topic of
research on its own, and is out of the scope of this paper.
Communicational Sensors. One category of the sen-
sors which users are relatively more concerned about in-
cludes WiFi, Bluetooth and NFC. For example one of
the participants commented that: “I am not concerned
with physical [motion, orientation, accelerometer, etc.]/
environmental [light, pressure, etc.] sensors, but network
ones. Hackers might be able to transfer my information
and PIN”. These sensors appearing more risky to the users
is understandable since we asked them to what extent they
were concerned about each sensor in regard to the PIN
discovery.
Identity-related Sensors. Another category which has
been rated more risky than others contains those sensors
which can capture something related to the user’s iden-
tity i.e. fingerprint, TouchID, GPS, camera, and micro-
phone. Despite that we described a PIN-related scenario,
our participants were still concerned about these sensors.
This was also pointed out by a few participants through
the comments. For example a user stated: “..., however,
GPS might reveal the location along with the user input
PIN that has a risk to reveal who (and where) that PIN
belongs to. Also the fingerprint/TouchID might recog-
nize and record the biometrics with the user’s PIN”. Some
of these sensors such as GPS, fingerprint, and TouchID,
however, can not cause the disclosure of PINs on their
own. Hence, the concern does not entirely match the ac-
tual risk. Similar to the discussion on touch screen, we
believe that a more general risk model on mobile technol-
ogy influences the users to perceive risk on specific threats
such as the one we presented to them.
Environmental Sensors. The level of concern on am-
bient sensors (humidity, light, pressure, and temperature)
is generally low and stays low after the users are provided
with the description of the sensors (see Fig. 6). In many
cases, our users expressed that they were concerned about
these sensors simply because they did not know them:
“[now that I know these sensors,] I am quite certain that
movement/environmental sensors would not affect the se-
curity of personal id/passwords etc.”. In fact, researchers
have reported that it is possible to infer the user’s PIN us-
ing the ambient light sensor data [33], although, to our
knowledge, exploits of other environmental sensors have
not been reported in the literature.
Movement Sensors. On the sensors related to the
movement and the position of the phone (accelerometer,
gyroscope, motion, orientation, and rotation), the users
display varying levels of the risk perceptions. In some
cases they are slightly more concerned, but in others
they are less concerned once they know the functional-
ity. Some of our users stated that since they did not know
these sensors, they were not concerned at all, but others
were more concerned when they were faced with new sen-
sors. Overall, knowing, or not knowing these sensors has
not affected the perceived risk level significantly, and they
were rated generally low in both cases.
Motion and Orientation Sensors. The sensors which
we used in our attack, namely orientation, rotation, and
motion, have not been generally scored high for their risk
in revealing PINs. Users do not seem to be able to re-
late the risk of these sensors to the disclosure of their
PINs, despite that they seem to have an average general
understanding about how they work. On hardware sensors
such as accelerometer and gyroscope, the risk perception
seems to be even lower. A few comments include: “In my
everyday life, I don’t even think about these [movement]
sensors and their security. There is nothing on the news
about their risk”, and “I have never been thinking about
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these [movement] sensors and I have not heard about their
risk”. On the other hand, some of the participants ex-
pressed more concerns for sensors that they were familiar
with, as one wrote, “You always hear about privacy stuff
for example on Facebook when you put your location or
pictures”. Similarly, it seems that having a previous risk
model is a factor that might explain the correlation be-
tween the user’s knowledge and their perceived risk.
7 Discussions
7.1 General knowledge versus risk percep-
tion
Figs. 5 and 6 suggest that there may be a correlation be-
tween the relative level of knowledge users have about
sensors and the relative level of risk they perceive from
them. We confirm our observation of correlation using
Spearman’s rank-order correlation measure. As it can be
seen in Table 6, we present the Spearman’s correlation be-
tween the comparative knowledge and the perceived risk
about different sensors for different participants’ dataset:
group one before being presented with the sensor descrip-
tions, group one after sensor description, group two after
sensor descriptions, and finally groups one and two after
being presented with the sensor descriptions.
For each participants’ dataset, the sensors are sepa-
rately ranked based on the level that the users are familiar
with them, similar to Figure 5. Accordingly, the levels
of concern are ranked too. The Spearman’s correlation
equation has been applied on these ranks for each group
separately.
For example, the Spearman’s correlation between the
comparative knowledge (median: “I know what this is,
but I don’t know how this works”, IQR11: “I’ve never
heard of this” – “I know very well how this works”) and
the perceived risk about different sensors for group one
(median: “Not concerned”, IQR: “Not concerned” – “A
little concerned”) before knowing the sensor descriptions
is r = 0.61 (p < 0.05).
As it can be seen, these results support that the more
the users know about these sensors, the more concern they
express about the risk of the sensors revealing PINs. We
acknowledge that other methods of ranking the results,
11interquartile range
Participants’ Status Spearman’s
dataset correlation
Group 1 Before sensor desc. 0.61
Group 1 After sensor desc. 0.61
Group 2 After sensor desc. 0.48
Groups 1 and 2 After sensor desc. 0.58
Table 6: Spearman’s correlation between the comparative
knowledge and the perceived risk about different sensors.
e.g. using median, produce slightly different final rank-
ings. However, given the high confidence level of the
above test, we expect the correlation to be supported if
other methods of ranking are used.
Assuming that customer demand drives better security
designs, the above correlation may explain why sensors
that are newer to the market have not been considered as
OS resources and consequently have not been subject to
similar strict access control policies.
7.2 Perceived risk vs the actual risk
We are specifically interested in the users’ relative risk
perception of sensors in revealing their PINs in compari-
son to the actual relative risk level of these sensors. We
list the results reported in the literature in Table 3 for the
following sensors: light, camera, microphone, gyroscope,
motion, and orientation. Fig. 6 shows that users gener-
ally have expressed more concern about sensors such as
camera and microphone than accelerometer, gyroscope,
orientation, and motion. This does not match the ac-
tual risk levels since the latter sensors allow PIN recov-
ery with higher accuracy as we have shown in Section 4.
When asked after filling the questionnaire, most partici-
pants could not come up with realistic attack scenarios us-
ing camera and microphone. For microphone, some users
thought they might say the PIN out loud. For camera, a
few of our participants thought face recognition might be
used to recover the PIN, hence they rated camera’s risk
to their PINs high. One user thought the camera might
capture the reflection of the entered PIN in her glasses.
Among our participants, one mentioned but described
doubt about motion, orientation, accelerometer, and gyro-
scope being able to record the shakes of the mobile phone
while entering a PIN after they saw the sensor descrip-
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tions: “I feel those positional sensors might be able to re-
veal something about my activities, for example if I open
my banking app or enter my PIN. But it is extremely hard
for different users, and when working with different hands
and positions”. This participant expressed only “a little
concern” about them, stating that: “..., and by little con-
cern, I mean extremely little concern". One of our par-
ticipants was completely familiar with these attacks and
in fact had read some related papers. This user was “ex-
tremely concerned”. Other users who rated these sensors
risky in general, said they were generally concerned about
different sensors. One commented: “I can not think of
any particular situation in which these sensors can steal
my PIN, but the hackers can do everything these days.”
7.3 Possible Solutions
In this section, we discuss the current academic and indus-
trial countermeasures to mitigate sensor-based attacks.
7.3.1 Academic approach
Different solutions to address the in-app access attacks
have been suggested in the literature: e.g., restricting the
sensor to one app, reducing the sampling rate, temporal
pause of the sensor on sensitive entries such as keyboard,
rearranging keyboard for password entrance, asking for
explicit permission from the user, ranking apps based on
their similarities to malware, and obfuscating anomalies
in sensor data [29, 4, 33, 36, 32, 26, 27, 30, 14, 7]. How-
ever, after many years of research on showing the serious
security risks of sensors such as accelerometer and gyro-
scope, none of the major mobile platforms have revised
their in-app access policy.
We believe that the risks of unmanaged sensors on mo-
bile phones, specially through JavaScript code, are not
known very well yet. More specifically, many OS/app
level solutions such as asking for permissions at the in-
stallation time, or malware detection approaches would
not work in the context of a web attack. In our previ-
ous work [25], we suggested to apply the same security
policies as those for camera, microphone, and GPS for
the motion and orientation sensors. Our suggestion was
to set a multi-layer access control system on the OS and
browser levels. However, the usability and effectiveness
of this solution are arguable. First, asking too many per-
missions from the user for different sensors might not be
usable. Furthermore, for some basic use cases such as
gesture recognition to clear a web form, or adjusting the
screen from portrait to landscape, it might not make sense
to ask for user permission for every website. Second, with
the increase of the number of sensors accessible through
mobile browsers, this approach might not be effective due
to the classic problem of sidestepping the security proce-
dure by users when it is too much of a burden [10]. As
stated by one of our participants: “I don’t mind these sen-
sors being risky anyway. I don’t even review the permis-
sion list. I have no other choice to be able to use the app”.
Moreover, as we have shown in Section 5, users gener-
ally do not understand the implications of these sensors
on discovering their PINs for example, even though they
know how these sensors work. Hence, such an approach
might not be effective in practice.
7.3.2 Industrial approach
W3C Device Orientation Event Specification. There
is no Security and Privacy section in the latest official
W3C Working Draft Document on Device Orientation
Event [2]. However, at the time of writing this paper, a
new version of the W3C specification is being drafted,
which includes a new section on security and privacy
issues related to mobile sensors12, as suggested by us
in [25]. The authors working on the revision of the W3C
specification point out the problem of fingerprinting mo-
bile devices [8], and touch action recovery [25] through
these sensors, and suggest the following mitigations:
• “Do not fire events when the page where they
were registered on is not visible or has been back-
grounded.”
• “Fire events only on the top-level browsing context
or same-origin nested iframes.”
• “Limit the frequency of events (typically 60 Hz
seems to be sufficient).”
We believe that these measures may be too restrictive
in blocking useful functionalities. For example, imagine a
user consciously running a web program in the browser to
12w3c.github.io/deviceorientation/spec-source-orientation.html
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monitor his daily physical activities such as walking and
running. This program needs to continue to have access
to the motion and orientation sensor data when the user
is working on another tab or minimizes the browser. One
might argue that such a program should be available as
an app instead, hence the use case is not valid. However,
it is expected that the boundary between installed apps
and embedded JavaScript programs in the browser will
gradually diminish [13].
Mobile browsers. As we showed in [25], browsers
and mobile operating systems behave differently on pro-
viding access to sensors. Some allow access only on
the active webpage and any embedded iframes (although
with different origins), some allow access to other tabs,
when browser is minimized, or even when the phone is
locked. Hence, there is not a consistent approach across
all browsers and mobile platforms. Reducing the fre-
quency rate has been applied to all well-known browsers
at the moment [25]. For instance, Chrome reduced the
sensor readings from 200 Hz to 60 Hz due to security con-
cerns13. However, our attack shows that security risks are
still present even at lower frequencies. iOS and Android
limit the maximum frequency rate of some sensors such
as Gyroscope to 100 Hz and 200 Hz, respectively. It is
expected that these frequencies will increase on mobile
OSs in the near future and in-browser access is no ex-
ception. In fact, current mobile gyroscopes support much
higher sampling frequencies, e.g., up to 800 Hz by STMi-
croelectronics (on Apple products), and up to 8000 Hz
by InvenSense (on the Google Nexus range) [26]. With
higher frequencies available, attacks such as ours can per-
form better in the future if adequate security countermea-
sures are not applied.
Following our report of the issue to Mozilla, starting
from version 46 (released in April 2016), Firefox restricts
JavaScript access to motion and orientation sensors to
only top-level documents and same-origin iframes14. In
the latest Apple Security Updates for iOS 9.3 (released
in March 2016), Safari took a similar countermeasure by
“suspending the availability of this [motion and orienta-
tion] data when the web view is hidden”15. However,
we believe the implemented countermeasures should only
13bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=421691
14mozilla.org/en-US/security/advisories/mfsa2016-43/
15support.apple.com/en-gb/HT206166
serve as a temporary fix rather than the ultimate solution.
In particular, we are concerned that it has the drawback
of prohibiting potentially useful web applications in the
future. For example, a web page running a fitness pro-
gram has a legitimate reason to access the motion sensors
even when the web page view is hidden. However, this is
no longer possible in the new versions of Firefox and Sa-
fari. Our concern is confirmed by members in the Google
Chromium team16, who also believe that the issue remains
unresolved.
7.4 Biometric sensors
As we explained in section 5.2, there exist around 25 dif-
ferent sensors on mobile platforms. They include com-
municational sensors such as WiFi, environmental sen-
sors such as ambient light, movement sensors such as mo-
tion and orientation, and biometric sensors such as Fin-
gerprint. Here we specifically discuss biometric sensors
since they are highly related to the individuals’ identity.
After decades of working on password, it seems that
people still cannot remember strong passwords. Bio-
metrics have been offered to users as an effective au-
thentication mechanism. Examples include TouchID and
Fingerprint sensors on iOS and Android devices respec-
tively. But the biometric-based authentication is not lim-
ited to mobile devices only. For example, when paying
with iPhone contactlessly, you need to rest your finger on
TouchID and hold your iPhone in close proximity to the
contactless reader until the task is finished. Furthermore,
since many banks have already moved their services to
mobile platforms, they benefit from the biometrics sen-
sors available on mobile devices, say for implementing 2-
factor authentication. As an example, in addition to user
name and passwords, HSBC authenticates their customers
through TouchID17 and voice ID18. Another example is
Smile to Pay facial recognition app19 where deep learning
is applied to overcome the difficulty of face authentication
when the face photo is not in the normal form. Recently
Yahoo has also introduced its ear-based smartphone iden-
16bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=523320
17us.hsbc.com/1/2/home/personal-banking/pib/mobile/touchid
18hsbc.co.uk/1/2/contact-and-support/banking-made-easy/voice-id
19brandchannel.com/2015/03/16/alibaba-demos-smile-to-pay-facial-
recognition-app/
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tification system20.
On the other hand, our findings show that mobile users
are relatively concerned with identity-related or biometric
sensors. However, we discussed that these sensors are not
necessarily the most risky ones to PINs in practice. As
we mentioned earlier, we believe that this might be the
influence of a more general risk model that the users have
on mobile technology. We believe that this is an important
research topic and requires further studies.
7.5 Limitations
We consider this work a pilot study that explores user risk
perception on a comprehensive list of mobile sensors. We
envisage the following future work to address these limi-
tations and expand this work:
• More Participants: We performed our user studies on
a set of users who were recruited from a wide range
of backgrounds. Yet the number of the participants is
limited. A larger set of participants will improve the
confidence in the results. With a large and diverse
set of participants, we can also study the effect of
demographic factors on perceived risk.
• Other Risks: We studied the perceived risk on PINs
as a serious and immediate risk to users’ security.
The study can be expanded by studying users’ risk
perception on other issues such as attackers discov-
ering phone call timing, physical activities, or shop-
ping habits.
• Other Types of Access: When interviewing our par-
ticipants, we presented them with a scenario involv-
ing a game app which is installed on their smart-
phone. This only covers the in-app access to sen-
sors. However, people might express different risk
levels for other types of access, e.g., in-browser ac-
cess. This needs further investigation.
• Issues with Training Users. We decided to provide
our participants with a short description of each sen-
sor’s functionality (details in Appendix B, part 3).
Furthermore, the participants were given the chance
to ask as many questions as they wanted to fully un-
derstand the functionality of each sensor. This might
20bbc.co.uk/news/technology-32498222
not be the most effective way to inform users about
sensors since some descriptions might seem too tech-
nical (and hence not fully understandable) to some
users. How to inform users in an effective way is a
complex topic of research which can be explored in
the future.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced PINlogger.js, a web-based
program which reveals users’ PINs by recording the mo-
bile device’s orientation and motion sensor data through
JavaScript code. Access to mobile sensor data via
JavaScript is limited to only a few sensors at the moment.
This will probably expand in the future, specially with the
rapid development of sensor-enabled devices in the Inter-
net of things (IoT).
We also showed that users do not generally perceive
a high risk about such sensors being able to steal their
PINs. Furthermore, we showed that people are not even
generally knowledgeable about these sensors on mobile
devices. Accordingly, we discussed the complexity of de-
signing a usable and secure solution to prevent the pro-
posed attacks. Hence, designing a general mechanism for
secure and usable sensor data management remains a cru-
cial open problem for future research.
Many of the suggested academic solutions either have
not been applied by the industry as a practical solution, or
have failed. Given the results in our user studies, design-
ing a practical solution for this problem does not seem
to be straightforward. A combination of different ap-
proaches might help researchers devise a usable and se-
cure solution. Having control on granting access before
opening a website and during working with it, in com-
bination with a smart notification feature in the browser
would probably achieve a balance between security and
usability. Users should also have control on reviewing,
updating and deleting these data, if stored by the website
or shared with a third party afterwards. Solutions such
as Taintroid [16], a tracking app for monitoring sources
of sensitive data on a mobile which has been applied for
GPS in [5] could be helpful. After all, it seems that an
extensive study is required toward designing a permission
framework which is usable and secure at the same time.
Such research is a very important usable security and pri-
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vacy topic to be explored further in the future.
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A Call for Participation Flyer and
Participant Demographics
In this section, we present the participants demographics
in details and the flyers that we used for call for participa-
tion of our user studies.
B Interview Script
Hi. Thanks very much for contributing to our study. In
this interview, we will ask you to fill in a few question-
naires about mobile sensors such as GPS, camera, light,
motion and orientation. You are encouraged to think out
loud as you go through, and please feel free to provide
any comments during the interview. There is no right
or wrong answer, and our purpose is to evaluate the mo-
bile sensors, not you. Everything about this interview is
anonymous. Please provide some information about your-
self in Table 8.
Part One
A list of multiple mobile sensors is presented below. To
what extent do you know each sensor on a mobile device?
Please rate them in the table (Table 9 was used).
Part Two
Imagine that you own a smartphone which is equipped
with all these sensors. Consider this scenario: you have
opened a game app which can have access to all mobile
sensors. You leave the game app open in the background,
and open your banking app which requires you to enter
your PIN.
Do you think any of these sensors can help the game
app discover your entered PIN? To what extent are you
concerned about each sensor’s risk to your PIN? Please
rate them in the table (Table 10 was used). In this sec-
tion, please only rely on the knowledge you already have
about the sensors, and if you do not know some of them,
describe your feeling of security about them.
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Figure 8: Sample of flyer distributed for participant recruitment.
Part Three
Let us explain each sensor here:
• GPS: identifies the real-world geographic location.
• Camera, Microphone: capture pictures/videos and
voice, respectively.
• Fingerprint, TouchID: scans the fingerprint.
• Touch Screen: enables the user to interact directly
with the display by physically touching it.
• WiFi: is a wireless technology that allows the device
to connect to a network.
• Bluetooth: is a wireless technology for exchanging
data over short distances.
• NFC (Near Filed Communication): is a wireless
technology for exchanging data over shorter dis-
tances (less than 10 cm) for purposes such as con-
tacless payment.
• Proximity: measures the distance of objects from the
touch screen.
• Ambient Light: measures the light level in the envi-
ronment of the device.
• Ambient Pressure (Barometer), Ambient Humidity,
and Ambient Temperature: measure the air pressure,
humidity, and temperature in the environment of the
device, respectively.
• Device Temperature: measures the temperature of
the device.
• Gravity: measures the force of gravity.
• Magnetic Field: reports the ambient magnetic field
intensity around the device.
• Hall sensor: produces voltage based on the magnetic
field.
• Accelerometer: measures the acceleration of the de-
vice movement or vibration.
• Rotation: reports how much and in what direction
the device is rotated.
• Gyroscope: estimates the rotation rate of the device.
• Motion: measures the acceleration and the rotation
of the device.
• Orientation: reports the physical angle that the de-
vice is held in.
• Sensor Hub: is an activity recognition sensor and its
purpose is to monitor the device’s movement.
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Please feel free to ask us about any of these sensors for
more information.
Now that you have more knowledge about the sensors,
let us describe the same scenario here again. Imagine that
you own a smartphone which is equipped with all these
sensors. You have opened a game app which can have ac-
cess to all mobile sensors. You leave the game app open
in the background, and open your banking app which re-
quires you to enter your PIN.
Do you think any of these sensors can help the game
app to discover your entered PIN? To what extent are you
concerned about each sensor’s risk to your PIN? Please
rate them in the table (Table 10 was used). In this part,
please make sure that you know the functionality of all
the sensors. If you are unsure, please have another look at
the descriptions, or ask us about them.
Thanks very much for taking part in this study. Please
leave any extra comment here.
An Amazon voucher and a business card are in this en-
velope. Please contact us if you have any questions about
this interview, or are interested in the results of this study.
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Sex Age Job/Background Mobile (y) Sex Age Job/Background Mobile (y)
f 23 Civil Eng. Nokia (0) f 27 Teacher HTC(3)
f 28 Customer Support HTC (2) m 30 Services iPhone (4)
f 22 Media Sony (3) m 26 Computer Samsung (7)
m 43 IT iPhone (9) m 30 Teacher Blackberry (7)
f 27 Media iPhone (9) m 52 Nanotechnology Nokia (0)
m 18 Mathematics Samsung (3) m 41 Nanotechnology HTC (10)
f 30 Management iPhone (7) m 47 Lecturer Samsung (2)
m 22 Medical iPhone (10) f 39 Physics iPhone (4)
f 27 Human Mgmt. Huawei (9) f 31 Biology Samsung (10)
f 21 Literature Samsung (4) m 39 Student iPhone (6)
m 35 Media Samsung (6) f 30 Civil Eng. iPhone (5)
f 20 Languages Samsung (3) m 20 Student Samsung (4)
f 59 Services iPhone (3) f 52 Admin Samsung (3)
m 40 IT LG (7) f 30 Admin Samsung (5)
m 21 Biomedical Samsung (4) f 58 Admin iPhone (12)
f 22 Biomedical OnePlus (6) f 44 Admin Samsung (3)
m 30 Civil Eng. Samsung (3) f 27 Student Motorola (5)
m 29 Geodesy Samsung (7) f 47 Services iPhone (5)
m 28 Medical Sony (5) m 67 Teacher Nokia (0)
f 38 Computer Samsung (5) m 23 Student Nexus (5)
f 30 Animation iPhone (9) m 46 Cable Maker iPhone (5)
f 56 Business Mgmt. iPhone (11) m 35 Services Samsung (5)
f 29 Admin Samsung (5) f 39 Admin iPhone(5)
f 30 Admin Samsung (6) f 24 Student Gionee (3)
m 47 Driving Instructor Sony (11) f 34 Education iPhone (4)
f 28 Admin Motorola (7) m 32 Student OnePlus (6)
m 40 Education LG (5) f 37 Researcher Honor (3)
m 32 Computer iPhone (6) m 33 Industrial Mgmt. iPhone(12)
f 25 Law HTC (3) f 33 Mathematics Samsung (3)
m 30 Student Nexus (5) m 27 Student iPhone (18)
Table 7: Participants’ self-reported demographics in the two studies, (y) indicates the years of owning a smartphone
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Age
Gender
Profession/ background (optional)
1st language (optional)
Mobile device
Duration of owning a smartphone/tablet
Table 8: Demography
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Sensor I’ve never I’ve heard I know what I know I know
heard of this of this but I this is but I generally very well
don’t know don’t know how this how this
what this is how this works works works
Bluetooth
Gyroscope
GPS
Sensor Hub
Ambient Temperature
Accelerometer
Magnetic Field
Motion
Fingerprint
Orientation
Proximity
Ambient Pressure
Hall Sensor
Rotation
Touch Screen
Camera
TouchID
Barometer
Gravity
Microphone
Ambient Humidity
WiFi
Ambient Light
NFC
Device Temperature
Table 9: This form was used for part one
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Risk to PIN
Not A little Moderately Extremely
Sensor Concerned Concerned Concerned Concerned Concerned
Bluetooth
Gyroscope
GPS
Sensor Hub
Ambient Temperature
Accelerometer
Magnetic Field
Motion
Fingerprint
Orientation
Proximity
Ambient Pressure
Hall Sensor
Rotation
Touch Screen
Camera
TouchID
Barometer
Gravity
Microphone
Ambient Humidity
WiFi
Ambient Light
NFC
Device Temperature
Table 10: This form was used for parts two and three
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